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Abstract 
Consumers clearly have a role to play in the global fight against climate 
change since even relatively small changes in patterns of household 
consumption could significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  But what 
evidence is there that consumers do consider the environmental impacts of 
products when shopping?  Indeed, how psychologically salient are the carbon 
footprint labels now appearing on a range of products in various countries?  
Here we test the psychological salience of this information using eye-tracking to 
identify, on a frame-by-frame basis, individual fixations on various features of 
the packaging, including carbon footprint.  We found that the mean fixation 
level for carbon footprint was 12.2%, indicating it was indeed as salient as other 
important features.  High or low levels of carbon footprint had no significant 
 2 
effect on gaze fixation.  We also found no significant relationship between self-
reported attitudes to low carbon products and overall level of fixation, nor was 
there any significant relationship between implicit attitude and level of fixation.  
But implicit attitude did significantly impact on the point of first fixation, in that 
those with a strong positive implicit attitude were significantly more likely to 
fixate first on carbon footprint information.  This suggests that carbon labelling 
could potentially be effective for some consumers, those with the right implicit 
attitude.  Measures of explicit attitude, on the other hand, seemed to be largely 
irrelevant.  The implications of this finding for sparking a ‘green revolution’ in 
consumer habits through the provision of carbon footprint information for 
consumers is discussed. 
 
Introduction  
Enlisting the help of consumers in the fight against climate change is at 
the heart of many political and business agendae across the world (Walker and 
King 2008), and central to the strategic vision of many leading multinational 
companies including organisations like Unilever, P&G and Tesco.  Many in the 
business and political spheres are optimistic about the chances of success here 
because there seems to be clear evidence, from self-report measures at least, that 
consumers are prepared to change their behaviour to help ameliorate the effects 
of climate change.  These self-report attitude surveys repeatedly tell us that the 
public are aware of the environmental issues surrounding climate change and 
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that they are prepared to modify their consumer habits.  For example, one 
survey reported that ‘70% of people agree that if there is no change in the 
world, we will soon experience a major environmental crisis’ (Downing and 
Ballantyne 2007).  Another survey reported that ‘78% of people say that they 
are prepared to change their behaviour to help limit climate change’ and that 
‘85% of consumers want more information about the environmental impacts of 
products they buy’ (Berry, Crossley and Jewell 2008).  
On the basis of such evidence many argue that one important weapon in 
the fight against climate change is the provision of carbon footprint information 
on products so that consumers can make informed decisions in the light of 
products’ environmental consequences.  In a speech in 2007, Terry Leahy, the 
then CEO of Tesco (the multinational supermarket chain), announced a call to 
arms to tackle the problem of climate change.  His message was simple.  He 
said that ‘The green movement must become a mass movement in green 
consumption.’  In order to achieve this goal Leahy argued that ‘we must 
empower everyone - not just the enlightened or the affluent.’  He believed that 
the market was ready for this green consumer ‘revolution’, and his proposed 
solution was to break down the barriers of price and information.  In other 
words, he was arguing, from a marketing and business point of view, that we 
must make green choices affordable and give the consumer the right 
information in the supermarket itself to make informed decisions to produce a 
‘revolutionary’ change in our patterns of consumption. 
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Some academics, however, have been more cautious and have argued that 
labels alone would not be ‘sufficient to meet frequently stated targets’.  But 
even they agree that carbon labels ‘can play an important role in the near term’ 
(Vandenbergh, Deitz and Stern 2011).  Others fall somewhere in the middle; 
they have concluded that carbon labels have a very important role to play here 
because once consumers start to adapt their own behaviour in response to the 
carbon labels on products, then they will expect farmers, businesses, importers, 
manufacturers, multinationals, even governments to do more to reduce the 
carbon footprint of the products they, the consumers, require. 
This general approach clearly has significant appeal at a number of 
different levels.  It would seem to empower consumers to act in a positive way 
for the environment by providing them with basic knowledge and information.  
In addition, it would allow them to behave in accordance with their (apparent) 
underlying attitude towards the environment.  It allows them to do what they 
really want to do anyway; it is an essentially liberating philosophy. 
However, this approach does make several major assumptions about 
consumers, their attitudes, the efficacy and importance of self-report measures 
for predicting behaviour, the underlying values of consumers and the 
psychological salience of carbon labels, all of which do require careful testing.  
The first specific assumption that needs to be examined is that self-reports are 
the best way of measuring attitudes and the best predictors of actual consumer 
behaviour.  Research has consistently shown that such self-report attitudes may 
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predict behaviour under certain situations, especially when people have the 
motivation and the opportunity to deliberate before making a behavioural 
choice, (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton and Williams 1995), but they are less good at 
predicting spontaneous behaviour under time pressure (Freise, Wanke and 
Plessner 2006; Beattie, 2010, Beattie and Sale 2011), or when consumers are 
under any sort of cognitive or emotional load, (Gibson 2008; Hoffman, Rauch 
and Gawronski 2007).  Unfortunately, time pressure, cognitive load and the 
dreaded mental shopping list (What have I forgotten?) (see Block and Morwitz, 
1999), and the absence of any opportunity to deliberate, characterises much of 
everyday supermarket shopping (Beattie and Sale, 2011).  Supermarket 
shopping is rarely found to be a slow, deliberate, reflective process, the shopper 
passes about 300 brands per minute (Rundh 2007) and each individual choice is 
often quick and automatic (Zeithaml 2008).  In such contexts, unconsciously 
held implicit attitudes might be a better predictor of actual consumer behaviour 
than explicit attitudes, where an implicit attitude is defined as ‘the 
introspectively unidentified…trace of past experience that mediates R’ [where 
R is the response – the favourable or unfavourable feeling, thought, or action 
towards the social object] (Greenwald and Banaji 1995: 5).  In other words, 
habitual consumer behaviour without much opportunity or motivation to 
deliberate might be driven by processes not open to introspection and therefore 
not picked up by self-report measures.  They require a different sort of measure.  
In the words of Greenwald and Banaji (1995: 5) ‘Investigations of implicit 
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cognition require indirect measures, which neither inform the subject of what is 
being assessed nor request self-report concerning it.’  
Despite numerous surveys of self-reported explicit attitude to the 
environment, few studies have attempted to gauge implicit attitudes to the 
environment, or to more specific phenomena such as low carbon products, using 
measurement techniques like the implicit association test (IAT).  This test uses 
speed of reaction and error rate as a measure of association in a simple and 
timed categorisation task.  For example, one version of the test measures the 
relative association of the concepts of ‘good’/‘bad’ with the concepts of ‘high 
carbon footprint’/‘low carbon footprint’ products (Vantomme, Geuens, De 
Houwer and Pelsmacker 2005, Beattie 2010).  Those studies that have measured 
both explicit and implicit attitudes within the same individual often find that 
there is little statistical relationship between the two measures, and that these 
two types of attitudes are ‘dissociated’.  Measures of explicit attitude, where 
such attitudes are considered to be conscious, controlled, reflective and slow, do 
not significantly correlate with measures of implicit attitude, where such 
attitudes are considered to be unconscious, automatic, impulsive and fast 
(Beattie and Sale 2009).  Some psychologists argue that implicit and explicit 
attitudes have structurally distinct mental representations, including distinct 
neural pathways in terms of the fundamental architecture of the brain (Chaiken 
and Trope 1999; Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler 2000). 
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The IAT is now widely used in some domains in psychology, including 
the broad area of psychology and race.  It has revealed some extraordinary and, 
on occasion, controversial results.  The IAT yields a measure of implicit attitude 
(called a ‘difference’ or ‘D’ score) that is often discrepant with the scores that 
emerge from explicit measures like the prototypical Likert scale.  For example, 
the IAT tends to reveal that although the majority of participants in certain 
Western countries (particularly the US and the UK) report that they have no 
racial preference in their self-reported attitudes; the vast majority of participants 
(including surprisingly a proportion of Black participants) seem to have a strong 
implicit pro-White preference, as reflected in a positive D Score, which is often 
significantly above the normal criterion of ‘strong positive’, namely +0.8.  A 
high positive D score also predicts a bias towards selecting just White 
candidates in a simulated shortlisting task when White and Black and Minority 
Ethnic candidates are being considered for a post, even when the candidates are 
presenting with identical CVs (see Beattie 2013; Beattie, Cohen and McGuire in 
press). 
Currently, despite the plethora of research on self-report attitudes to the 
environment we actually know very little about the nature of implicit attitudes 
in this important domain.  But the carbon labelling approach to ameliorating the 
effects of climate change seems to be based on the premise that the kinds of 
attitudes that predict actual consumer behaviour are going to be positive.  Given 
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that such attitudes are likely to be implicit rather than explicit this needs to be 
explicitly tested.     
A second major assumption underlying the carbon labelling approach is 
that the carbon footprint image or icon is sufficiently salient to consumers that 
they will actually attend to it whilst shopping in supermarkets within the 
appropriate time frame.  Without minimal attention (and perhaps more than 
minimal attention given the amount of information actually represented in the 
carbon label), carbon footprint cannot possibly influence consumer choice.  
However, shoppers pass brands every 1/5th second in supermarkets (Gelperowic 
and Beharrell 1994) and spend between 5 and 7 seconds looking at possible 
items for purchases.  This means that the attention of the consumers needs to be 
highly selective.  We have known for some considerable time that attention 
reflects individual needs and values (Bruner and Goodman 1947) but are 
consumer values towards the environment sufficiently positive here to direct 
attentional processes towards carbon labels?   Carbon footprint information has 
to compete in this cognitively rich environment with all of the other important 
types of information on products, including price, calories or energy, fat 
content, brand, special offers, sell-by date etc., all vying for the attention of the 
consumer.  So how salient is the carbon footprint on products to consumers?  
We know from other domains that some information labels on products 
can influence consumer choice presumably because of the ‘needs and values’ of 
the consumer.  The Guideline Daily Allowance (GDA) nutritional labelling 
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scheme is one such example, and one that has often been cited, not least by the 
CEO of Tesco himself when Tesco launched its own carbon labelling scheme.  
Tesco had found, by monitoring its own clubcard data, which records details of 
all transactions in its supermarkets, that sales of low fat meals increased when 
GDA was introduced whilst sales of high fat meals decreased, all in a relatively 
short time frame.  For example, sales of their salmon en croute (with a GDA fat 
content of 53% and a saturated fat content of 91%) went down by 29% in the 
two month period after GDA information was introduced, whereas sales of their 
vegetable curry (with a GDA fat content of 25% and a saturated fat content of 
20%) went up by 33%.   This real world example suggests that GDA 
information on food products was attended to and acted on; indeed the effects 
on consumer choice were fairly rapid.  The salience of nutritional labels for 
consumers is also backed up by experimental research in the area of visual 
processing of product labels using eye tracking technology, where people’s 
patterns of eye movements and individual fixations are monitored as they look 
at products.  Such eye tracking is viewed as ‘an unobtrusive, sensitive, real-time 
behavioural index of ongoing visual and cognitive processing’, which provides 
accurate data on the allocation of attention (see Beattie, McGuire and Sale 
2010).  Eye tracking is an important technique in this research because there is 
evidence that self-reported viewing of nutritional information tends to be higher 
than the objective figures as revealed by eye-tracking.  In other words, when it 
comes to certain types of behaviour you cannot rely on what people say.  
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Visschers, Hess and Siegrist (2010), using eye tracking, found that 66% of their 
participants looked at the nutrition label on the front of cereal packets, and those 
packets with a simple design seemed to be more successful in drawing 
participants’ attention to the nutrition label.  They also found that those 
participants who approached the task with a particular ‘health motivation’ spent 
more time viewing the nutritional information than those participants who 
approached the task with a ‘taste motivation’.  Graham and Jeffery (2011) 
monitored adult participants viewing food items on a computer and found that 
calorie information was the most salient feature (71% of participants looked at 
this), with 61% looking at fat content and 40% at carbohydrate content 
So the argument goes, carbon footprint could (and should) have a similar 
effect.  Indeed, a piece in the Economist in June 2011 reported encouraging 
signs of progress in the following words,  ‘In Britain, a pioneer in carbon 
labelling, nine out of ten households bought products with carbon labels last 
year….and total sales of such products exceeded £2 billion’.  But what is 
interesting about the quote is that the missing words are ‘albeit mostly 
unwittingly’.  Nevertheless, the plan then was for Tesco to include carbon 
footprint on each of its 70,000 own brand products.  Other major multinationals 
were to follow suit. 
But in a controlled eye tracking experiment (Beattie, McGuire and Sale 
2010), it was discovered that carbon footprint was unfortunately not like GDA 
nutritional information.  People were eye-tracked as they looked at images of 
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various products with carbon labels (Tesco low energy light bulb, orange juice 
and ‘Non-Bio’ liquid detergent).  Each of these products had an array of 
competing information represented on their packaging.  In this study, 
participants were shown simultaneous front and back views of each product (see 
Figure 1-3) on a computer screen (these were rotated on each successive trail 
with the position of the front and back views relative to each other switched) 
and point of gaze was analyzed on a frame-by-frame basis, 25 times per second, 
for a 10 second viewing time (indicative of the upper levels of attentional focus 
in a supermarket where customers consider an individual product).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  One version of the light bulb stimulus used in the Beattie, 
McGuire and Sale (2010) eye tracking study.  
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Figure 2: One version of the orange juice stimulus used in the Beattie, 
McGuire and Sale (2010) eye tracking study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: One version of the detergent stimulus used in the Beattie, 
McGuire and Sale (2010) eye tracking study.  
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We analyzed level of fixation in the first 5 seconds, the second 5 seconds, 
and also the first fixation period of 200 milliseconds (or 5 successive gaze 
points).  What we found was that the pattern of visual attention varied 
considerably depending on the product type.  In the case of the clearly ‘green’ 
low energy light bulb, our participants looked at the carbon footprint (the 
carbon footprint icon plus the associated information) for a high proportion of 
the time (a mean of 65.3 frames across both right and left rotated views, or 
26.1% of the time).  See Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: An example of one participant’s gaze at the carbon footprint 
label on the low energy light bulb 
 
In the case of the orange juice they looked at the carbon footprint for a 
mean of 24.9 frames (or 10.0% of the total time), dipping to 5.7% for one 
stimulus view.  In the case of the detergent the mean figures were 8.2 frames 
and 3.3% of the total time.  In terms of the time course of gaze at the light bulb, 
attention was directed within the first five seconds at the carbon footprint icon, 
but attention only moved to the accompanying textual material in the second 
five second period.  It seemed to take much longer for participants to attend to 
the basic carbon footprint icon in the case of the orange juice (only really 
appearing in the second five second interval), and in the case of this product 
they hardly attended to the accompanying information at all.  In the case of the 
detergent, there was minimal visual attention to any aspect of the carbon 
footprint.  Importantly, in less than 7% of cases overall did the participants 
fixate immediately on the carbon footprint icon or the accompanying carbon 
footprint information.  And, these results may (if anything) represent an over-
estimation of attention in situ because we simultaneously presented front and 
back views of the products; in supermarkets customers would have had to go to 
the trouble of turning the products around (GDA information is, of course, 
represented on the fronts of most products). 
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Psychologists have argued that ‘Humans have an impressive capacity to 
determine what is salient in their environment and direct attention in a timely 
fashion to such items.’ (Bowman, Su, Wyble and Barnard 2009).  Carbon 
footprint labels should be salient to participants (and if you relied solely on 
what people reported in surveys then you would surely conclude that they are 
very salient indeed).  But this preliminary eye tracking study, which did not rely 
on self report data, does raise some questions about their salience. It also raises 
some serious questions about the plausibility of igniting a ‘green revolution’ in 
consumer behaviour by presenting carbon labels on products.  If people do not 
attend to such labels in the first place then the ‘green revolution’ is likely to be 
postponed for some considerable time. 
   This original study into carbon labels and visual attention (Beattie, 
McGuire and Sale 2010) clearly requires careful consideration.  Perhaps, the 
most striking result in this study was the considerable variation in level of 
fixation towards carbon footprint information depending on the particular 
product.  A high level of visual attention was directed at the carbon footprint of 
the low energy light bulb (18.2% of a 10 sec. interval) but the carbon footprint 
of other products (e.g. the detergent) received only minimal visual attention (see 
also Beattie 2010).  But this study was, of course, exploratory and to a certain 
extent, inconclusive because although it did identify significant differences in 
level of fixation to various products it did not identify which features of the 
products were responsible for this.  Did participants attend more to the carbon 
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footprint of the low energy light bulb because they knew that the footprint 
would be low, thus reflecting some sort of ‘optimism bias’ where gaze 
preference ‘towards positive and away from negative images…reflect an 
underlying motivation to regulate emotions and to feel good.’ Isaacowitz 2005; 
Isaacowitz 2006; but see also Beattie and McGuire 2011 for some contrary 
evidence).   If this were the case, then it would have major implications for the 
potential efficacy of carbon labelling.  Consumers might only check the carbon 
footprint of products that they know are low, not wanting to ‘see’ the bad news 
on others (like some weight-conscious consumers not checking the fat content 
of chocolates which they know already are ’naughty but nice’ and which are 
bought regardless).  Or, did the results reflect the fact that low energy light 
bulbs are highly associated in people’s minds with being environmentally 
friendly, and therefore the unconscious eye movements move automatically to 
carbon footprint when this product is presented?  Or, were the results affected 
by the physical features of the product labels, including simple things like the 
relative size of the different categories of information represented?  And why 
did our participants look much less at the carbon footprint on the detergent?  
Was it because of how the footprint was represented on the detergent bottle 
(some physical attribute of the representation)?  Or was it because the carbon 
footprint of the detergent was high?  Or was it something to do with the strength 
of the mental association between (positive) environmental issues and 
detergent?  These are all potentially extremely important questions because of 
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the emphasis being placed on carbon labelling as a potential solution to the 
issue of climate change.  But without testing some of these basic alternative 
hypotheses, and determining the psychological salience of the carbon footprint, 
much effort in this domain could well be wasted. 
The present study was an attempt to test experimentally some of these 
basic alternate hypotheses.  We investigated the salience of carbon footprint 
information by controlling the physical size of information labels for three 
attributes (carbon footprint, price, energy/calories) on a range of products which 
did not have ready made environmental associations (unlike low energy light 
bulbs which clearly do), but systematically changing both the price and the 
carbon footprint information to examine the impact of these changes on 
unconscious visual fixation.  An additional question concerns whether implicit 
attitude predicts gaze direction and focus on carbon footprint, as it does in at 
least one other domain in the area of sustainability.  Beattie and McGuire (2012) 
attempted to determine how eye movements towards or away from iconic 
images of climate change/environmental damage were affected by different 
attitudinal measures (either explicit or implicit).  The theoretical justification for 
this work derived from the early research of the Nobel Laureate Daniel 
Kahneman (1973) on attention and effort.  In Kahneman’s words ‘In the 
absence of a specific instruction to search for visual information, spontaneous 
looking is controlled by enduring dispositions that determine which parts of the 
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field of view should attract and hold the gaze’ (ibid. 52).  In our study we 
wanted to find out whether implicit or explicit attitudes were a good measure of 
‘enduring dispositions’ here.  We did this by projecting slides onto a computer 
screen, each slide containing three images, one positive image of nature, one 
negative image of climate change/environmental damage and one neutral image 
(pictures of cups, plates and other everyday objects).  See Figure 5.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The eye gaze of one participant with one stimulus array. The gaze 
here is directed at the negative image in the middle of the screen (Beattie and 
McGuire 2011) 
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We found that people do not focus inordinately on the negative images of 
climate change/environmental damage when there are other positive images and 
neutral images available.  They usually look less than 40% of the time at the 
negative images.  But very importantly those who the IAT reveals have strong 
positive implicit attitudes to carbon footprint are significantly more likely to 
focus on the negative images of climate change/environmental damage than 
positive images of nature, and they focus more on these images than those who 
do not have such strong implicit attitudes.  We also found that this even occurs 
in the first 200 milliseconds of viewing the slide.  Those with a positive implicit 
attitude to low carbon footprint products looked more at the negative images of 
climate change/environmental damage in the first 200msecs compared with 
those with less strong positive implicit attitudes to low carbon footprint 
products.  Measures of explicit attitude did not, however, predict patterns of eye 
movement towards the negative images in this way.  It would seem that those 
who have strong implicit pro-low carbon attitudes are primed to attend to these 
sorts of images, whereas those who only report strong attitudes are not (they 
actually looked less).   
This was both a novel and exciting finding in that we clearly build our 
representations of the world using those features of scenes that we notice and 
some significant association between attitudes and attentional focus might give 
us some insight into how and why people develop quite different 
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representations of the world and the dangers it faces (and presumably act 
differently as a consequence).  This particular study suggested that there is a 
significant connection between implicit attitudes and gaze fixations.  But how 
should we interpret this?  After all, we merely observed an association between 
attitudes and behaviour (and, of course, association does not imply causality), 
but one that nevertheless opens up intriguing theoretical and practical 
possibilities.  One interpretation of the results would be that those who have a 
strong implicit attitude towards low carbon footprint products (i.e. are more 
environmentally friendly) focus more on negative images of climate 
change/environmental damage and because of this essential ‘priming’ are in a 
position to receive other appropriate environmental messages (like carbon 
footprint).  An alternative interpretation would be that causality works the other 
way around with attentional focus shaping the implicit attitude.  Of course there 
is also the third possibility that both interpretations are correct and that causality 
works both ways.  But going with the first interpretation for the moment, this 
significant pattern of ‘primed’ eye movement occurs in such a short interval 
(one fifth of a second) that it is pre-conscious.  This might mean that those with 
positive implicit attitudes could potentially direct attention to any appropriate 
imagistic representations relevant to climate change/environmental damage 
(including, carbon footprint) very quickly.  This, at least, is a potential 
hypothesis but one that offers some hope to the lobby that says we could change 
consumer behaviour by providing carbon footprint information to consumers. 
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But should we really expect this attentional focus to occur with carbon 
labels?  This is not necessarily an easy question to answer at the present time.  
You could argue in the affirmative that a positive implicit attitude would predict 
an intrinsic interest in anything to do with the environment and climate change, 
be it an iconic image of the consequences of climate change, or an informational 
label on a product denoting what its carbon footprint actually is.  But you could 
also argue the opposite case on the basis that we are now very familiar with 
iconic images of climate change, indeed one such iconic image, depicting the 
stranded polar bear on the diminishing ice floe, is an immediate and 
recognizable signifier of climate change.  Indeed, this has become something of 
a clichéd image of climate concern.  So much so that coming up to Christmas 
2011 Coca Cola teamed up with the WWF to ‘help the polar bear’, and, in an 
attempt to publicly display their ‘green credentials’, changed the design of their 
famous cans.  See Figure 6.  They put polar bears on the cans, changed the 
colour of their cans from red to white, and launched 1.4 billion of these special 
edition cans onto the market.   
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Figure 6: An example of the special edition Coca Cola can, which was launched 
onto the market in 2011. 
 
Muhtar Kent, Chairman and CEO of the Coca-Cola Company had this to 
say about the campaign ‘We want to help the polar bear – a beloved Coca-Cola 
icon since 1922 – by helping conserve its Arctic habitat’ (see the brandchannel 
October 25th 2011).  As the British newspaper the Telegraph commented (3rd 
December 2011) ‘It was the first time in 125 years that the regular product had 
been switched from its trademark red cans.’ 
The outcome, however, was not in the end positive.  The design and the 
colour had to be abandoned because consumers complained that the white cans 
were too easily confused with the silver Diet Coke brands.  And, in addition, the 
new colour also seemed to affect the taste of the product, which in fact was 
unchanged.  One should perhaps remember that a change in taste perception as a 
function of visual cues is not unusual (see Ghose and Lowengart 2001).  Market 
forces inevitably won out in the end and the cans were dropped. 
Of course, the ‘meaning’ of the polar bear (and our emotional response) 
to it has changed significantly between 1922 and the present day but by using 
the polar bear image Coco-Cola simultaneously signified its product’s long 
tradition (in the period leading up to Christmas tradition is, of course, a very 
important concept), but it explicitly tried to communicate that a sugary brand of 
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drink with no nutritional content that is sold in aluminium cans is actually very 
‘environmentally sensitive’. 
But the important point in the present context is that if iconic images 
signifying climate change are used to market products like Coca Cola then this 
indicates how immediate (and how emotional) our response to them must be.  
This emotional response could be crucial to driving our behaviour in the 
appropriate time frame (see Damasio 1994).  Presumably, a market leader like 
Coca Cola would have tested this very carefully before it proceeded.  Would 
carbon footprint labels, without that significant period of association with 
climate change, and without the same emotional response (see Beattie 2012), 
have the same effect and draw the eyes unconsciously towards them as a 
function of our underlying implicit values?  The answer could well be negative. 
Of course, if those with positive implicit attitudes did show higher levels 
of fixation on carbon footprint labels, or more immediate fixations on the 
carbon footprint information, this could have important implications for the 
efficacy of carbon labelling schemes.  It would also have potentially important 
implications for the likelihood (or not) of a ‘green revolution’ in consumer 
habits merely through careful marketing and informed consumer choice. In 
other words, it is a question of some considerable practical as well as theoretical 
importance. 
 
Method 
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Four different non-branded packages were created for muesli, cake mix, 
ice lollies and detergent (see Figures 7 - 10).  On each slide – there were 6 
features, namely (1) product name, (2) product image, (3) carbon footprint (icon 
plus text ‘working with the carbon trust’, and carbon value e.g. 0.6g CO2), (4) 
price, (5) energy value (calories, number of washes) and (6) bar code.  Product 
image was in colour, the rest were all in black and white.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The stimulus used for the muesli product.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: The stimulus used for the washing powder product. 
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Figure 9: The stimulus used for the ice lollies product. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: The stimulus used for the cake mix product. 
 
 
Price and carbon footprint information were systematically varied 
yielding 4 combinations of high price/high carbon footprint (CF); high 
price/low CF; low price/high CF; low price/low CF.  Energy value (calories or 
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number of washes for detergent), bar code, product name and image were all 
kept constant.  Sixteen different stimulus slides were used (4 products times 4 
combinations); each contained one product name and image plus bar code with 
three different information labels (carbon footprint, price, and energy).  The 
position of these different information labels was systematically rotated on the 
product (See Figure 11).  The information labels were always the same size, 
3cm x 2.5 cm = (7.5 cm2), and the monitor was 33cm x 24 cm = (792 cm2).  The 
order of presentation of the slides was randomised.  
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Figure 11:  How CF, energy and price labels were rotated on one product. 
 
 
 
The image of the product was always located in the middle of the slide.  
An angle Ө for the location of each information label was selected using the 
randomization algorithm below and a point for the centre of the image was 
calculated using the formula for r: 
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Ө = Random ( (J-1) * 120 + Z - 20, J * 120 + Z + 20 ) 
(Where J=group number; Z= random ( 0, 90 )) 
r = Random (picturesizewidth, displaysizewidth) 
loop until no overlap. 
 
Figure 12: The randomization algorithm for assigning position of images on the 
screen 
 
The slides were shown for 10 seconds and then replaced by the next slide 
in the sequence.  The focus was on spontaneous looking at these slides, 
following the logic of Kahnemann ‘In the absence of a specific instruction to 
search for visual information, spontaneous looking is controlled by enduring 
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dispositions that determine which parts of the field of view should attract and 
hold the gaze.’  There were 22 participants in total; all were university 
undergraduates paid £5 for their participation.   
 
Procedure 
An ASL Model 504 remote eye tracker was set up in front of the 
computer monitor on which the stimulus material was shown.  The eye tracker 
employs a camera surrounded by infrared emitting diodes to illuminate the eye 
of the participant looking at a screen.  The participants’ point of gaze on the 
screen is determined by the camera combining the position of the pupil and the 
corneal reflection.  The remote camera in the eye tracker fed into a screen for 
the experimenter’s observation of the positioning of camera observing the eye.  
From a separate computer, the experimenter was able to adjust the illumination 
of the infra red camera and the ‘pan/tilt’ of the camera in the eye tracker to 
enable recognition of the pupil and corneal reflection.  Participants were seated 
in front of the eye tracker. The eye tracker was adjusted to record each 
participant’s right eye, the participant then had to undergo a 9-point calibration 
procedure.  The calibration was carried out by asking each participant to gaze at 
each of the nine numbers on the screen in front of them (and told by the 
experimenter when to look at each number in turn).  The numbers were on the 
extreme left, middle and extreme right of the screen, at the top, middle and 
bottom of the screen.  If the dots signifying gaze were not on the numbers as 
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required, when the recordings were checked, then adjustments to the settings 
were made, and the participant was restarted in the calibration procedure.  
Finally, participants were told simply that they were going to be shown a series 
of images, which were not specified in advance.   
 
Scoring 
The recordings were analysed using a freeware mpeg2 video editing 
program (mpeg2cut2) with frame advance function to analyse mpeg2 video 
clips.  Each 40 ms frame was coded by a human observer in terms of where 
each of the participants was looking.  There were 22 participants (16 slides x 10 
seconds x 25 frames per sec.) generating 88,000 individual data points 
individually coded and analyzed.  Each frame was scored as having gaze focus 
on carbon footprint/price/energy/product image/other.  See Figure 13. 
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Figure 13:  The pattern of gaze at one stimulus slide (every 10th frame is 
represented here) 
 
 
Attitude measurement 
Participants completed two computerised self-report attitudinal measures 
(a Likert scale and a Feeling Thermometer) after the eye tracking was complete 
(see Figures 14 and 15). The Likert scale assesses explicit preference towards 
high/low carbon footprint products.  Participants were asked: ‘Which statement 
best describes you?’ on a 5-point scale (1 = ‘I strongly prefer products with a 
high carbon footprint to a low carbon footprint’; 5 = ‘I strongly prefer products 
with a low carbon footprint to a high carbon footprint’).  The Feeling 
Thermometer assesses explicit feelings of warmth and coldness towards 
products with high/low carbon footprints.  Participants were asked: ‘Please rate 
how warm or cold you feel toward the following products’ (1 is ‘very cold’; 5 is 
‘very warm’).  Thermometer difference (TD) scores (ranging from - 4 to + 4) 
were calculated by subtracting the score given to the high carbon product from 
the score given to the low.  Positive scores indicate a preference for products 
with a low carbon footprint.  
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Figure 14: A computerised version of the Likert scale for measuring 
attitudes to carbon footprint. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15:  A computerised version of the Feeling Thermometer scale for 
          measuring attitudes towards high and low carbon footprint products. 
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Implicit Association Test (IAT)  
There were two target categories (low carbon footprint/high carbon 
footprint) and two attribute categories (good/bad). Exemplars from these 
categories appeared in the middle of the screen and participants were asked to 
sort the exemplars into their respective categories which appeared at the top 
left- and right-hand corners of the screen.   To sort exemplars into the left-hand 
category, participants were asked to press z (on the left-hand side of the 
keyboard) and to sort exemplars into the right-hand category participants were 
asked to press m (on the right-hand side of the keyboard).  In total, there were 
seven trials where trial blocks 1, 2 and 5 were practice trials and trial blocks 3, 
4, 6 and 7 were the critical trials where participants were required to sort 
exemplars into one of two categories that appeared simultaneously.  The 
reasoning behind the IAT is that participants should find it easier to sort 
exemplars if the paired target categories are associated (therefore responding 
faster with fewer errors) and harder to sort exemplars if the paired target 
categories are not associated (therefore responding slower with more errors).  
Thus, participants who associate low carbon footprint products with ‘good’ and 
high carbon footprint products with ‘bad’ should respond slower on trials where 
the pairs are good/high carbon footprint and bad/low carbon footprint and faster 
on trials where the pairs are good/low carbon footprint and bad/high carbon 
footprint.  The converse should be true for participants who associate low 
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carbon footprint products with bad and high carbon footprint products with 
good. 
The computerised versions of the seven trials are shown below in Figures 
16 - 22. This is what the participants actually saw on the computer screen in our 
IAT:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Figure 16: 1st trial: low vs. high carbon footprints.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: 2nd trial: good vs. bad. 
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Figure 18 and 19: 3rd and 4th trial: 
Good or high carbon footprints vs. bad or low carbon footprints. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: 5th trial: high vs. low carbon footprints. 
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Figure 21 and 22: 6th and 7th trial: 
Good or low carbon footprints vs. bad or high carbon footprints. 
 
 
 
IAT effect scores were computed by following the following scoring 
algorithm: 
1. Exclude trials where latencies are above 10,000 ms. 
2. Exclude trials where over 10% of trials had latencies lower than 300 ms. 
3. Calculate mean response latencies for Blocks 3 and 4, and Blocks 6 and 7. 
4. Calculate the difference score for Blocks 3 and 4 and Blocks 6 and 7. 
5. Divide the two difference means by their standard deviations. 
6. Average the scores to compute the D score for each participant. 
There was no specific time penalty for errors in this version of the IAT.  If 
participants made a mistake then they had to press the correct key before 
moving on and this additional step represented the time penalty. 
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The D score reflects the difference in latencies during the critical trials 
and the error rate.  D score effect sizes are similar to Cohen’s d (Cohen 1988) 
and usually take the form of small, medium and large values of 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 
respectively.  Positive IAT effect scores reflect a preference for low carbon 
footprint products, negative effect scores reflect a preference for high carbon 
footprint products (D scores between - 0.2 and + 0.2 are considered neutral). 
 
Results 
The mean amount of time spent looking at the carbon footprint label was 
12.2%, with a range from 8.8% (low CF/high price muesli) to 16.2% (low 
CF/low price cake mix).  Participants spent significantly more time spent 
looking at carbon footprint than they did at price across the 16 stimuli 
(Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test, T= 19½, n = 21, p< 0.001, 2-
tailed test), but not significantly more time looking at carbon footprint than 
energy value (T= 58, n = 19, n.s.).  See Fig. 23.   
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Figure 23: Mean percentage of time spent looking at different features of 
products. 
 
 
 
These results suggest that carbon footprint is intrinsically salient when the 
size of the label is carefully matched with other labels (like price and energy 
value) and when the information is represented on the front of the product.  Of 
course, in a real shopping situation price is likely to be significantly more 
important than it was in this particular experimental task where no actual 
purchase had to be made 
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Whether the carbon footprint information was high or low had no 
significant effect on level of fixation (all 8 Wilcoxon tests here were non-
significant with T values ranging from 75.5 to 121).  See Figure 24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24:  Mean percentage of time spent looking at carbon footprint 
with different products of different prices with error bars. 
 
 
 
 
Analyses of the attitude measures revealed that the average Likert score 
was 3.7 (moderately pro-low carbon) with a standard error of 0.16, and a mean 
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of 1.7 for T.D. score (moderately pro-low carbon) with a standard error of 0.31. 
The IAT revealed that the average D score was 1.9 (strongly pro-low carbon) 
with a standard error of 0.4, suggesting that the average implicit attitude was 
more positive than the average explicit attitude in this particular sample.  
However, and importantly, 5 participants still showed implicit scores that were 
much less pro-low carbon than their self-reported attitudes would suggest (4 had 
negative D scores indicating a preference toward high carbon products, one was 
neutral, despite all 5 scoring 4 or 5 on the Likert scale).  Similar results have 
been reported elsewhere (Beattie 2010).  
Next, we considered the relationship between explicit attitudes and the 
proportion of time spent looking at carbon footprint information on each slide.  
The way the analyses was done was by comparing those with a strong positive 
explicit attitude, which we operationally defined as 4 or 5 on the Likert scale, 
compared with those with neutral or negative explicit attitude, operationally 
defined as 1,2 or 3 on the Likert scale.  There were 14 in the first set (strong 
positive explicit attitude) and 8 in the second set (neutral or negative explicit 
attitude).  Each stimulus array was considered separately.  In each case n  = 14 
and n2=8 and in no case was there any significant statistical effect.  See Table 1.  
In other words, those who express a strong positive attitude to carbon footprint 
do not spend significantly more time looking at the carbon label on products. 
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Table 1: The effects of explicit attitude to carbon footprint on possible 
selective attention to carbon footprint information. 
 
Proportion of time spent looking at carbon 
footprint information 
Statistical comparisons 
Mann-Whitney U test 
U values 
(n1=14, n2=8) 
Stimulus array Strong 
positive 
explicit 
attitude  
(4/5 on Likert 
scale) 
Neutral or 
negative 
explicit attitude  
(1/2/3 on  
Likert scale) 
Muesli 
CF –High 
Price -High 
12.2 14.9 53       
Muesli 
CF –High 
Price -Low 
13.9 16.5 48       
Muesli 
CF –Low 
Price -High 
8.7 9.0 50½   
Muesli 
CF –Low 
Price -Low 
10.8 6.9 52½   
Ice Lollies 
CF-High 
Price - High 
10.4 9.7 52       
Ice Lollies 
CF-High 
Price - Low 
11.6 11.9 55½   
Ice Lollies 
CF-Low 
Price - High 
11.5 18.7 38½   
Ice Lollies 
CF-Low 
Price - Low 
10.2 9.5 53       
Detergent 
CF – High 
13.8 11.6 49½   
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Price - High 
Detergent 
CF – High 
Price – Low  
14.1 13.1 50       
Detergent 
CF – Low  
Price - High 
8.9 11.8 47       
Detergent 
CF – Low 
Price - Low 
18.9 6.6 47       
Cake mix 
CF – High 
Price - High 
8.0 11.9 39       
Cake mix 
CF – High 
Price - Low 
10.9 9.5 43       
Cake mix 
CF – Low 
Price - High 
11.9 12.2 52       
Cake mix 
CF – Low 
Price - Low 
16.5 15.6 55       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next analysis considered whether implicit attitude had any effect on 
the proportion of time spent looking at carbon footprint information.  We 
operationally defined strong positive implicit attitude as anything above the 
median D score (D = 1.69) and a more negative implicit attitude as anything 
below the median.  In this case, of course, there were 11 in the first set (with a 
mean D score of 3.24) and 11 in the second set (with a mean D score of 0.46; 5 
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of the 11 had a negative D score).  The fixation level on carbon footprint was 
1.01% lower for those with high D scores compared to lower D score, with 
means of 11.27% and 12.28% respectively, and there was no significant 
relationship between D score and level of fixation on carbon footprint 
information (T= 49, n=16, n.s.) when the statistical comparison was made 
across the 16 stimulus arrays.  See Table 2. 
Table 2: The effects of implicit attitude to carbon footprint on possible 
selective attention to carbon footprint information. 
 
Proportion of time spent looking at carbon 
footprint information 
Statistical comparisons 
Mann-Whitney U test 
U values 
 (n1=11, n2=11) 
Stimulus 
array 
Strong positive 
implicit 
attitude  
Less positive 
implicit attitude  
Muesli 
CF –High 
Price -High 
11.3 15.0 49       
Muesli 
CF –High 
Price -Low 
19.8 9.9 46       
Muesli 
CF –Low 
Price -High 
14.6 3.0 22       
Muesli 
CF –Low 
Price -Low 
6.6 12.1 41½   
Ice Lollies 
CF-High 
Price - 
High 
7.6 12.7 52½   
Ice Lollies 
CF-High 
Price - Low 
11.2 12.2 50½   
Ice Lollies 
CF-Low 
Price - 
High 
15.4 13.0 51½   
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Ice Lollies 
CF-Low 
Price - Low 
9.7 10.2 60½   
Detergent 
CF – High 
Price - 
High 
8.4 17.7 37½   
Detergent 
CF – High 
Price – 
Low  
16.6 11.0 51       
Detergent 
CF – Low  
Price - 
High 
9.6 10.3 55       
Detergent 
CF – Low 
Price - Low 
11.0 17.8 49       
Cake mix 
CF – High 
Price - 
High 
9.0 8.3 53       
Cake mix 
CF – High 
Price - Low 
9.2 11.7 49       
Cake mix 
CF – Low 
Price -High 
8.3 15.8 46       
Cake mix 
CF – Low 
Price - Low 
13.2 19.3 50       
 
 
  We also found no significant correlation between D score (as a measure 
of strength of implicit attitude) and the proportion of time spent looking at the 
carbon footprint information when each stimulus slide was considered 
separately (with 16 correlations computed, the various Spearman Rank Order 
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Correlation Coefficients ranged from 0.02 to -0.31). See Table 3.  In other 
words, there seemed to be no systematic relationship between the measure of 
implicit attitude and the overall level of fixation on the carbon label, in direct 
contrast to what had been found with iconic images of climate change reported 
in Beattie and McGuire (2012). 
 
Table 3: Mean percentage of time spent looking at CF information for each of 
the 4 products (and the 4 combinations of each product). 
 
Product High D score  
(above the median) 
Low D score  
(below the median) 
Cake mix   9.0   9.8 
  9.2 14.9 
  9.2 11.7 
11.2 21.2 
Muesli 11.3 15.0 
14.5   3.1 
19.8   9.9 
10.2   8.4 
Detergent   8.4 17.7 
  9.9 10.1 
16.6 11.0 
11.0 17.9 
Ice lollies 11.2 12.2 
10.9   9.1 
  9.0   9.8 
  9.2 14.9 
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Thus, there seems to be no relationship between either measure of explicit 
or implicit attitude and the overall proportion of time spent looking at the 
carbon footprint information.  But this does not mean that there might not be 
some more subtle differences in patterns of attention between the two groups.  
This was highlighted in the study by Beattie and McGuire (2012).  In that study 
there was an overall difference in level of gaze as a function of implicit attitude, 
but in addition there were also distinct gaze biases operating within the first 200 
milliseconds.  The group with a high positive implicit attitude towards carbon 
footprint spent a significantly higher proportion of the time within the first 200 
milliseconds looking at negative images of climate change than positive images.  
So the question for the present study is – what is the relationship between 
attitudinal measures and early attentional focus on carbon footprint 
information?  Before attempting to answer this, we must consider one important 
difference between the two studies.  Iconic images of climate 
change/environmental damage are both instantly recognizable and emotionally 
laden and the question of whether they draw gaze immediately was clearly an 
interesting and pertinent one for the former study.  Carbon footprint is different 
in that the images (and accompanying text) are less immediately recognizable 
and less emotionally laden (see again Beattie 2012) and certainly need more 
time to process.  So in this study what we concentrated on was where the first 
fixation occurred, operationally defined as 200 milliseconds of gaze at the same 
target area (in other words, 5 successive gaze points at the same target).  The 
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target areas we were interested in were the three main attributes of the product, 
namely carbon footprint, price and energy value.  The prediction was that 
implicit attitude should influence first fixation; and more specifically that those 
with a positive implicit attitude should be more likely to fixate first on carbon 
footprint information.  An additional, and entirely open, question was how 
many individual 40msec gaze points occurred before this first fixation was 
achieved.  Table 4 shows how this was scored for one participant looking at the 
different stimulus arrays.  It documents the number of gaze points before a 
fixation was achieved and what the focus of that first fixation was.  You can see 
that this participant had a high D score of 5.62, in other words, this was 
someone with a very high positive implicit attitude.  Their first fixation was on 
‘carbon footprint’ in the case of 11 out of 16 stimulus arrays, and it took a mean 
of 23.5 individual gaze points (40 milliseconds each) to arrive at this fixation.  
The next most frequent fixation target was ‘energy’ with 4 cases (and 16.7 gaze 
points to arrive at this), and ‘price’ in just one case.  This type of analysis was 
carried out with respect to all 22 participants.   
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Table 4: The first fixation of one individual with a strong positive implicit 
attitude. 
 
Participant mp2477 
D score 5.62 
Slide Number of 40 msec. 
intervals before first 
fixation achieved 
First fixation 
Cake mix 
CF-high Price-low 
10 Carbon Footprint 
Cake mix 
CF-high Price-high 
30 Carbon Footprint 
Ice lollies 
CF-high Price-low 
41 Carbon Footprint 
Muesli 
CF-high Price-low 
27 Carbon Footprint 
Ice lollies 
CF-low Price-high 
50 Carbon Footprint 
Cake mix 
CF-low Price-high 
15 Energy 
Washing powder 
CF-low Price-low 
30 Energy 
Muesli 
CF-low Price-high 
5 Energy 
Muesli 
CF-high Price-high 
30 Carbon Footprint 
Ice lollies 
CF-low Price-low 
14 Carbon Footprint 
Washing powder 
CF-low Price-high 
10 Carbon Footprint 
Washing powder 
CF-high Price-low 
10 Carbon Footprint 
Muesli 
CF-low Price-low 
7 Carbon Footprint 
Ice lollies 
CF-high Price-high 
12 Energy 
Cake mix 
CF-low Price-low 
40 Price 
Washing powder 
CF-low Price-low 
30 Carbon Footprint 
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Table 5 shows the fixation pattern of one individual who had a negative implicit 
attitude towards carbon footprint.  Note that here the first fixation was on 
‘carbon footprint’ in just 4 out of the 16 cases (with a mean of 15.3 gaze points 
to arrive at this fixation).  ‘Energy’ value of the product was the most frequent 
point of first fixation for this participant (7 cases), with ‘price’ in second place 
with 5 cases.  See Table 5.  
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Table 5: The first fixation of one individual with a negative implicit attitude 
towards carbon footprint. 
Participant mp2446 
D score -0.47 
Slide Number of intervals 
before first fixation 
achieved 
First fixation 
Cake mix 
CF-low Price-low 
39 Price 
Cake mix 
CF-high Price-high 
9 Price 
Ice lollies 
CF-low Price-low 
19 Energy 
Washing powder 
CF-high Price-low 
10 Price 
Muesli 
CF-high Price-high 
20 Energy 
Ice lollies 
CF-high Price-high 
14 Energy 
Ice lollies 
CF-low Price-high 
7 Carbon Footprint 
Cake mix 
CF-high Price-low 
5 Energy 
Washing powder 
CF-low Price-high 
9 Price 
Cake mix 
CF-low Price-high 
32 Carbon Footprint 
Muesli 
CF-low Price-low 
12 Carbon Footprint 
Muesli 
CF-low Price-high 
10 Carbon Footprint 
Muesli 
CF-high Price-low 
5 Energy 
Washing powder 
CF-low Price-high 
14 Energy 
Washing powder 
CF-high Price-high 
17 Price 
Ice lollies 
CF-high Price-low 
12 Energy  
 51 
 
We then did a statistical analysis comparing the 6 participants with the 
most positive implicit attitude and the 6 with the least positive implicit attitude, 
as the most extreme members of our set of participants in terms of their 
underlying implicit attitude.  The mean D score for the 6 highest was 4.02 and 
the mean D score for the 6 lowest was -0.24.  Those with the most positive 
attitude had a mean of 7.0 first fixations on carbon footprint (out of a possible 
maximum of 16).  Those with the least positive attitude had a mean of 4.5 first 
fixations on carbon footprint.  
 
Table 6: First fixation on CF across the 16 stimulus arrays 
 
 Most positive implicit 
attitude (n=6) 
Least positive implicit 
attitude to (n=6) 
11 6 
7 4 
5 5 
8 5 
7 2 
4 5 
Mean 7.0 4.5 
 
 
 
 
 A Mann-Whitney U test revealed that those with the highest positive 
implicit attitudes were more likely to fixate first on carbon footprint information 
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than those with more negative implicit attitudes (U=7, n1=6,  n2=6, p<0.05: one-
tailed test). 
This did not occur with explicit attitude.  Those with the most positive 
explicit scores (defined on the basis of 4/5 on the Likert scale and a positive 
Thermometer Difference score) had a mean of 5.3 first fixations on carbon 
footprint.  Those with more negative explicit attitudes had a mean of 6.5 first 
fixations on carbon footprint.  This difference was both in the wrong direction 
and non-significant.  
These results could turn out to be very important because they suggest 
that implicit attitude has an impact on unconscious gaze behaviour such that 
individuals with a positive implicit attitude to certain environmental features are 
more likely to fixate first on carbon footprint information when they view 
certain products.  One possible implication of this is that it suggests that carbon 
footprint information might just work with those individuals who have got the 
right underlying attitude to the environment in the first place.  It also suggests 
that carbon labelling is not entirely doomed as an approach to inducing 
behavioural change in the case of promoting more sustainable consumption. 
 
Discussion   
Many influential figures in the worlds of politics and business have 
argued that one important weapon in the fight against climate change is the 
provision of carbon footprint information on products so that consumers can 
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make informed decisions in the light of the products’ environmental 
consequences.  The argument underpinning this has been that ‘the green 
movement must become a mass movement in green consumption’ but in order 
to achieve this some argued that ‘we must empower everyone - not just the 
enlightened or the affluent.’  Both politicians and business leaders have 
suggested that the solution here is to break down the barriers of price and 
information, to make green choices affordable and to give the consumer the 
right information to make informed decisions.  At considerable expense 
(because of the difficulties in actually computing accurate carbon footprint 
information) carbon labels have appeared on certain products in various 
countries across the globe.  But could this kind of approach ever work in 
psychological terms?  
One can, after all, see the obvious attractions of the approach.  It 
empowers consumers to act in a positive way for the environment and, in 
addition, it allows them to do what they say they really want to do, i.e. behave 
in accordance with their (reported) positive attitude towards the environment.  It 
also removes the need for more drastic action like government legislation or 
prohibitive pricing of high carbon alternatives.  But unfortunately it does make 
several large assumptions both about underlying attitudes (and their predictive 
value for consumer choice) and the salience of carbon labels, which this 
experimental study set out to test. 
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The study found firstly in terms of consumer attitude that measure of 
implicit attitude, which seem to predict much of everyday automatic consumer 
choice, do not relate closely to the usual self-report measures of attitude in line 
with previous findings (see Beattie, 2010).  Secondly, in terms of visual 
attention it found that participants do direct their attention at carbon labels for a 
significant proportion of the time, but this overall viewing figure is not affected 
by whether this information is high or low (and does not, therefore, reflect any 
‘optimism bias’ where people might avoid looking at high carbon products).  
The level of attention to carbon footprint is comparable to the level directed at 
other sorts of information on products, including price, energy value and even 
the product image itself.  This is an important result because without minimal 
visual attention to carbon footprint information this information could not 
possibly influence consumer choice.  But one must bear in mind here how the 
information was presented in the current study.  The carbon footprint was 
represented on the front of the package (it is normally represented on the back 
or the sides with a clear implicit message about its relative importance) and, in 
addition, the size of the carbon footprint label was carefully matched with the 
other labels, which tends not to be the case with real commercial products. 
However, the study also found that there was no significant relationship 
between how positive the explicit attitude to carbon footprint was and the 
overall amount of attention devoted to the carbon label.  No effect was found 
either with our measure of implicit attitude.  But very importantly there was a 
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significant statistical association between our measure of implicit attitude and 
the target of the first fixation.  Those individuals with the most positive implicit 
attitude were more likely to fixate first on the carbon footprint information 
(rather than ‘energy’ or ‘price’) compared with those with a more negative 
implicit attitude.  Those with the most positive implicit attitude had a mean of 
7.0 first fixations on carbon footprint whereas those with the least positive 
implicit attitude had a mean of 4.5 first fixations on carbon footprint.  This 
association did not, however, occur with explicit attitude.  Those with the most 
positive explicit scores (defined on the basis of 4/5 Likert scores and a positive 
Thermometer Difference score) had a mean of 5.3 first fixations on carbon 
footprint whereas those with more negative explicit attitudes had a mean of 6.5 
first fixations on carbon footprint.  As has already been pointed out this 
difference was both in the wrong direction and non-significant. So again we 
find evidence that measures of implicit attitude, but not measures of explicit 
attitude, predict patterns of unconscious eye movements (see also Beattie and 
McGuire 2012). 
This result could potentially have important practical implications in our 
efforts to do something about climate change.  We already know that consumers 
could be crucial in this fight.  According to the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment: ‘over the past 50 years, humans have changed ecosystems more 
rapidly and extensively than in any comparable period of time in human 
history.’  In the words of Stoddard and Cruickshank (2012) ‘The 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has found that global CO2 
emissions grew by 70 per cent between 1970 and 2004.  This is despite the 
overwhelming scientific consensus that increasing levels of CO2 in the 
atmosphere caused by human activity pose a serious threat to human well-being.  
This time frame also corresponds to the period during which the global 
community has come to understand human impacts on the environment better 
than ever before, and has developed an ever-expanding system of global 
governance to address these problems’ (2012: 9).  The authors add a coda that 
‘It is important to recognise that coincidence does not imply causality.  The 
continued degradation of the global environment has not been caused solely by 
government weaknesses, but rather by a multitude of drivers, including 
prevailing economic models and patterns of consumption and production’ (ibid: 
9).  Clearly, patterns of consumption are crucial to this change in CO2 emissions 
(along with prevailing economic models and patterns of production, as well as, 
quite probably, the absence of effective global governance) because, in many 
ways these everyday behaviours are at the centre of everything.  Change the 
patterns of consumption, and therefore the demand for certain products (and, of 
course, the needs, habits and aspirations of the consumer) and many other things 
will fall into place.  Many politicians and international companies have 
recognised this very point.  Hence the focus on providing the consumer with 
clearer information about the environmental consequences of the products they 
buy (in the form of carbon footprint labels).  An earlier study which examined 
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patterns of gaze fixation on products (Beattie, McGuire and Sale 2010) showed 
little visual attention to carbon footprint labels except on specific 
environmentally friendly products.  The present study, however, might hint at a 
slightly more optimistic conclusion.  It seems to offer the intriguing possibility 
that carbon footprint information might well work with the right set of 
individuals i.e. those with the right implicit attitude to the environment in the 
first place, in that they seem to fixate first on carbon footprint at least in an 
experimental situation. 
Of course, this study was both relatively small scale and an experimental 
analogue (although it did generate 88,000 individual gaze points that were 
individually scored and coded), and therefore does clearly need to be replicated 
on a much larger sample in a more ecologically valid setting for consumer 
choice.  But given the global significance of this topic and the potential 
importance of the conclusion we suspect that many people would agree that this 
genuinely does need to be done, and with some urgency. 
Of course, one other very important consideration also emerges from this 
study.  And that is, if we have a mechanism of influence (carbon labels) that 
might work with the right individuals (at least in terms of grabbing early pre-
conscious visual attention), how can we produce more of the right individuals 
within a reasonable time frame?  The answer will have to be a campaign, or a 
set of campaigns, to change not just what people say about the environment (see 
Beattie 2011) but their underlying implicit attitudes.  We know, of course, that 
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this will not be easy but there are clearly precedents for orchestrated change in 
implicit attitudes in a number of other domains (see Beattie 2013 for a 
discussion of studies that have changed implicit attitudes to race) and there are 
other examples to guide us in the case of consumer psychology (Gibson 2008) 
The over-arching question posed in the title of this paper was whether we 
can indeed harness the unconscious mind of the consumer in the fight against 
climate change.  This study offers the briefest glimmer of hope in that direction, 
our implicit (and unconsciously held) attitude to an environmental feature does 
seem to predict first fixation on carbon labels on products.  But what this study 
does more than anything else is remind us of all the untested assumptions 
underlying this whole consumer-based approach to tackling climate change.  
Clearly much new empirical work needs to be done in this area before we place 
all our trust in consumers and their spending habits, and their desire, either 
conscious or unconscious, to change these habits.   
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